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Solar Lease Negotiations from the Landowner's Perspective
In examining the evolution of oil and gas leases and related energy industry agreements in the recorded public records, it is interesting to observe when certain clauses begin to appear and how they develop with the passage of time as additional agreements are drafted. These modifications almost always emerge to address concerns that were not apparent to the parties during the early days of the particular industry, but eventually became problematic as basic forms were applied in practice. In this context, necessity remains the mother of invention. In the same manner, it is anticipated that solar lease drafting practices will evolve to address lessons learned by landowners and lessees as a result of the first wave of widespread solar development in Texas. In the meantime, attorneys that represent landowners must anticipate potential problems by employing a creative approach that considers various hypothetical scenarios and outcomes for each unique client and tract of land. This requires a high degree of situational awareness and attention to detail, in addition to a base knowledge of how solar power is generated, stored, transported and marketed.
Remaining or Going Private: Traditional and New Rationales
The going private transaction has been popular in the past and will likely continue in popularity, given the number of startup “exits.” In the alternative, companies could continue to remain private, as venture capital funding and mega-rounds give companies a way to operate privately and their founders to retain control. Traditional rationales were centered around public speculation and filing or disclosure requirements. I suggest that new rationales include control by founder/CEOs, although it is hard to be sure. In the future, there could be new trends, less founder-centric companies, and more rationales for remaining, or going, private.
A New Trend in Securities Fraud: Punishing People Who Do Bad Things
This article seeks to articulate a distinct view of federal securities law as it is increasingly used in non-traditional enforcement actions commenced to punish corporate bad behavior. This paper argues that these non-traditional enforcement mechanisms should be viewed with skepticism. This skepticism should not be misinterpreted as cynicism, as the author believes that these non-traditional enforcement actions are beneficial vehicles to accomplish the admirable governmental objective of “punishing people who do bad things.” However, the author recognizes that such use of securities law does not fall into a category of clearly defined criminal law and carries a significant risk of abuse. The author also recognizes the “admirable governmental objective” may be thwarted when it comes to private companies. Finally, the author is uneasy with the societal values conveyed when the government sanctions corporate misbehavior in the name of protecting shareholders from deception.