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Remaining or Going Private: Traditional and New Rationales
The going private transaction has been popular in the past and will likely continue in popularity, given the number of startup “exits.” In the alternative, companies could continue to remain private, as venture capital funding and mega-rounds give companies a way to operate privately and their founders to retain control. Traditional rationales were centered around public speculation and filing or disclosure requirements. I suggest that new rationales include control by founder/CEOs, although it is hard to be sure. In the future, there could be new trends, less founder-centric companies, and more rationales for remaining, or going, private.
A New Trend in Securities Fraud: Punishing People Who Do Bad Things
This article seeks to articulate a distinct view of federal securities law as it is increasingly used in non-traditional enforcement actions commenced to punish corporate bad behavior. This paper argues that these non-traditional enforcement mechanisms should be viewed with skepticism. This skepticism should not be misinterpreted as cynicism, as the author believes that these non-traditional enforcement actions are beneficial vehicles to accomplish the admirable governmental objective of “punishing people who do bad things.” However, the author recognizes that such use of securities law does not fall into a category of clearly defined criminal law and carries a significant risk of abuse. The author also recognizes the “admirable governmental objective” may be thwarted when it comes to private companies. Finally, the author is uneasy with the societal values conveyed when the government sanctions corporate misbehavior in the name of protecting shareholders from deception.
Liability of Parent Corporation -- Whether the parent is liable for the actions of its subsidiary when the parent does not perpetrate fraud
In R&M Mixed Beverage Consultants, Inc. v Safe Harbor Benefits, Inc. 578 S.W.3d 218 (Tex.App. - El Paso 2019, no pet.), the Court of Appeals cites the Texas Supreme Court for the proposition that there must be evidence that one of the corporations was using the other for purpose of perpetrating actual fraud for the defendant's direct personal benefit. The Court found that the record showed no evidence of actual fraud and therefore the parent would not be liable for the subsidiary's action.
Misbehaving Directors, Including Directors' Duties to Maintain the Confidentiality of Information
The conduct of corporate directors and officers is subject to particular scrutiny in the context of business combinations (whether friendly or hostile), executive compensation and other affiliated party transactions, allegations of illegal or improper corporate conduct, and corporate insolvency. The individuals who serve in leadership roles for corporations are fiduciaries in relation to the corporation and its owners. Increasingly the courts are applying principals articulated in cases involving mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”) to cases involving executive compensation, perhaps because both areas often involve conflicts of interest and self-dealing or because in Delaware, where many of the cases are tried, the same judges are writing significant opinions in both areas. Director and officer fiduciary duties are generally owed to the corporation and its shareholders, but when the corporation is insolvent, the constituencies claiming to be beneficiaries of those duties expand to include the entity’s creditors.